possibility of such a conflict. They would rather see these two goods-the individual and the social-as either in natural harmony with each other, or as essentially reconcilable. What happens though in cases where such a conflict exists and cannot be amicably resolved? It is a fact that cases where the personal good and the common good are antagonistic exist and the three philosophers had to face up to this fact. My task is to address each thinker in turn and see how his philosophy dealt with this problem.
The paper focuses on the cases of irreconcilable conflict between the common good and the personal good. It deals with two possible solutions to this conflict: when it is resolved in favour of the first, and when it is resolved in favour of the second. We shall see that the three thinkers tended to give priority to the common good over the personal good (though this is less true of Mill than of the other two). However, Bentham, Mill and Green were all genuinely concerned with the good of the individual and all gave serious theoretical backing to this concern. As giving priority to the personal good over the common good is a more difficult task than giving priority to common good over the personal good, I have paid special attention to how each of the three philosophers dealt with the former.
None of the three thinkers addressed directly the moral issue this paper raises.
So my aim is to find answers that are not readily available. In the process of reviewing each thinker in turn, I will try to resolve the problems that are touched but not dealt with. The conclusions are that (1) all three philosophers play an important role in the process of emancipating the status of the personal good, (2) that addressing the cases of irreconcilable conflict between the personal and the common good is an essential part of any theory of the nature of the good, and finally that (3) T H Green's moral philosophy is best suited to give a satisfactory solution to such irreconcilable conflicts.
Jeremy Bentham
For Bentham the good is pleasure (synonyms of pleasure being benefit, advantage, happiness) and the opposite of pain (synonyms of pain being evil, mischief, unhappiness). Bentham believed that human nature is such that we tend to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. The metaphor which he uses is that nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 2 The principle of utility recognises this subjection [to the governance of the two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure], and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.
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The principle of utility asserts both that we do in fact pursue pleasure and that we should do so, because this is the reasonable thing to do. In explaining the nature of the good Bentham reviews 14 kinds of pleasure. He refers to a wide and subtle range of pleasures including pleasures of the intellect, social pleasures and so on. He demonstrates that some pleasures are more complex than others-indeed that some pleasures contain an element of pain, like the pleasure of relief which is possible only as a result of the cessation of pain.
Bentham is very helpful in explaining how his utility principle differs from other moral perspectives. He gives as examples two other principles which are adverse to the principle of utility. These are the principle of 'asceticism' and the principle of 'sympathy and antipathy'. The principle of asceticism is the opposite of the principle of utility. Those who adopt it believe that pleasure is bad and pain is good. It may seem incredible that someone could adopt such a principle, but Bentham points to two classes of men who had embraced this principle-'a set of moralists', that is, the philosophers, and 'a set of religionists'. The first have tried to condemn pleasure, the second have tried to 'make it a matter of merit and duty to court pain'. 5 So the religionists have gone further than the philosophers. The philosophers have tried to make pain a matter of indifference, but they never proclaimed it to be something good.
They have also denounced pleasure, but not all pleasure-only basic, physical pleasures. Philosophers have glorified refined pleasures but always under a different name 'the honourable', 'the glorious', 'the reputable', 'the becoming'. 6 Although the philosophers are more subtle than the religious people, their views tend to lead to the same effect-to create an attitude of disapprobation of the principle of utility, branding anyone who adopts this principle with the term 'Epicurean'.
According to Bentham, the problem with the principle of asceticism is that it cannot help us run our public life. It could guide private conduct but it is thoroughly useless, indeed dangerous, when applied to the business of government. While the principle of utility can be consistently pursued, the principle of asceticism cannot. If only one tenth of humankind were to pursue it consistently, Bentham says, the world would turn into hell.
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The other principle averse to the principle of utility is the principle of sympathy and antipathy. The pitfall of this principle is its subjective character. According to this principle, one approves and rewards an action if one happens to like it, and disapproves or punishes an action if one happens to dislike it. According to Bentham, an element of objectivity is needed. There must be some empirical evidence about the nature of the action and Bentham believes that only the principle of utility provides the desired objective criterion.
To recapitulate: the good is the increase of pleasure and the diminution of pain.
However, whose good is this? Is it the good of the individual or the good of the community? The answer is both. For Bentham, defining the good of the individual is the same as defining the good of the community. The community is made of many individuals. In the same way in which the community is an aggregate of individuals, the good of the community is an aggregate of the good of the individuals. On the other hand, Bentham's concern with the good of society rivals his concern with the good of the individual. We can find its source in two main areas:
Bentham's 'second' definition of the utility principle and in his preoccupation with improving the system of legislation. Bentham defines the utility principle as increasing the pleasant and decreasing the painful, but also as 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. This second definition of the good, as the greatest happiness of the greatest number, means that the happiness of a single individual will always be trumped by the happiness of a group of people. This has always caused serious concern among liberal thinkers. But again, as was the case with psychological hedonism, it is possible to give a positive spin to this definition. It must be right that more happiness is better than less happiness; that more people being happy is better than fewer people, or than only one person being happy. Again this is a revolutionary 9 I am indebted to Irena Nicoll for her help in the discussion of these issues. 10 Bentham's reference to rights as 'nonsense upon stilts' is probably the most famous and often cited expression concerning the nature of rights and used as an example of a philosophical criticism of rights. element in Bentham's doctrine: the happiness of the majority is more important that the happiness of the selected few.
Bentham's commitment to the law also expresses his concern with the wellbeing of the community. For Bentham things like stability, lack of anarchy, existence of good legislation, good rules and norms are extremely important. Creating a society with stable patterns of interaction where expectations can be sustained is the business of any government. Bentham's aversion to anarchy and his admiration of, and commitment to, good laws demonstrates the importance for him of social well-being.
So far so good. Bentham cares about the good of individuals as individuals; he also cares about the good of the community. The question is whether he envisages a potential conflict and whether he offers a solution consistent with his utilitarian theory.
In the context of his critique of rights, Bentham makes the following statement:
'The greatest enemies of public peace are the selfish and the hostile passions: necessary as they are, the one to the very existence of each individual, the other to his security. ... Society is held together only by the sacrifice that men can be induced to make of the gratification's they demand: to obtain these sacrifices is the great difficulty, the great task of government.'
together (1) the good is what increases pleasure and diminishes pain: and this is so equally for individuals and for groups of people, and (2) the good is the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
The problem of the second way of defining the principle of utility is that it does not allow space for defending the good of the individual in those cases where this good is in conflict with the good of all. However, this definition "takes sides"-it takes the side of the good of the community, in the event of conflict. While the first definition seems to be fair to both the personal and the common good, it does not take conflict into account, and accordingly, does not offer a solution to conflict.
In the case where a conflict between the personal good and the common good exists, there are two options: when the conflict should be resolved in favour of the first, and when the conflict should be resolved in favour of the second. How can a single philosophical principle cover both sets of cases: the cases where the common good should have priority over the personal good and the cases where the personal good should be protected at all costs, that is, be proclaimed as a human right? Part of the answer to this question is already implied in the question itself. To start with, it is enough to agree that a moral theory should provide a solution to both cases, and we could temporarily postpone the answer to 'how' this could be achieved. A theoretical solution must be posited to reconcile the two cases.. It seems that, because of its double definition of utility, the utilitarian doctrine is able to do this. Because of this double definition, the doctrine is ambivalent with respect to its commitment to individual welfare versus its commitment to social welfare. It is committed to both, but not in a manner that offers philosophical reconciliation. This ambiguity can be convenient, but because of the inconsistency inherent in it, it can lead to problems.
To conclude: Bentham's utility theory does not offer philosophically consistent solutions to the two possible outcomes of the conflict between the personal good and the common good. Bentham resolves these issues in practice but not on a theoretical level. On the one hand, in the case of security, freedom to pursue personal good is of paramount importance. On the other hand, in the case of a lawful and orderly society, the common good overrides personal interests. But how does this square with the utilitarian theory is a question that remains unanswered.
J. S. Mill

J. S. Mill's understanding of the good, by definition, is similar, if not identical to
Bentham's:
According to the principle of utility or 'the Greatest Happiness Principle':
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.
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As with Bentham, this is both a description of how things are, and how they should be. In Mill's terms, this is both a 'theory of life' and a 'theory of morality'. Mill's purpose in Utilitarianism is to defend the doctrine against a set of strong criticisms. His dominant strategy is to portray utilitarianism as amenable to common sense, and he tries to achieve this by arguing that his doctrine promotes the overall well-being of society. He wants to dissociate utilitarianism from accusations of egoism. In this sense, Mill's promotion of the general happiness is an important part of his defence of the principle of utility.
Mill portrays the desire for general happiness as part and parcel of the desire for personal happiness. This is an argument that is characteristic of philosophers who tend to defend the importance of common good and it is typically made by idealist philosophers like T. H. Green, for example, as we shall shortly see. Mill claims that it is possible to develop one's character in a direction which makes the union between the desire for general and for personal happiness habitual. Education should be used 'to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole '. 20 This leads towards asserting the importance of the general happiness because it implies that if we see our own interest as diverging from the social interest we are showing weakness of character, and hence, doing something wrong. Indeed, after putting across these ideas, the moralistic spirit of the utilitarian doctrine becomes so overwhelming that Mill feels the need to soften his tone. Until now Mill has been defending utilitarianism against those who claimed that it was demeaning to human nature and therefore not a proper moral doctrine.
Eventually, he considers an accusation coming from the opposite direction: that, portrayed like this, utilitarianism is too moralistic and puts too much pressure on the individual to consider the good of all in every single action.
In the reply to this accusation, Mill's defence of the common good is considerably softer. His answer is that utilitarianism is concerned not with motives but with outcomes. It does not attempt to exercise power over people's thoughts, but rather to encourage some responsibility with respect to the outcome of one's actions.
It aims to provide guidelines about what is commendable. He points out that, in
practice, very few people-one in a thousand-are in a position to multiply the happiness of others. Only a public benefactor 'has it in his power to do this in an extended scale'. 21 The rest of us must settle for private happiness-our own and the happiness of those closest to us. and that suffering is the opposite of pleasure. He acknowledges but simultaneously disguises a conflict.
Bentham's solution is more straightforward and more realistic in the sense that
Bentham sees that certain people will remain displeased in their obedience to the law and he does not feel the need to explain this discomfort in some positive light. He does not make the extra effort which Mill does in order to reconcile personal discomfort with the public good. This weakens the integrity of his utilitarian theory.
Mill, on the other hand, tries very hard to maintain this integrity but achieves this at the cost of downplaying the realistic cost of personal sacrifice.
In the context of his defence of utilitarianism, Mill seeks reconciliation between personal happiness and the happiness of the greatest number. He tries to achieve this The idea is that personal development entails an element of defying social stereotypes. There is a necessary dimension to the conflict between society and the individual and winning this conflict is for the individual a test for personhood.
T. H. Green
Unlike his two utilitarian predecessors, Green introduced different concepts for the good and the moral good. For Green, the good is what satisfies desire. 23 The moral good is human perfection found in activities which contribute to the well-being of the community, and if possible, to the well-being of humankind. So for Green, how human nature actually works, and how it should work, are two distinguishable states of affairs. This can be explained by the fact that for Green, human beings are such that they are capable of progressing from one stage to a higher stage. Human nature is 22 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, London, 1985, p. 122. essentially perfectible. Because of this process of self-development, there is a difference between the ordinary good and the moral good.
The ordinary good (I call it 'ordinary' for convenience, to distinguish it from the moral good) is what satisfies desire. We may desire pleasure, but Green insists this is not always the case. Green thinks that utilitarians made a psychological mistake in claiming that we always want pleasure. Green wants to establish a distinction between the desired and the pleasant, and on the basis of this distinction, to demonstrate that his moral theory differs from the utilitarian one. He argues that we desire selfsatisfaction, not pleasure. However, at this stage-the stage of defining ordinary good-Green is not talking about sophisticated desires. I believe that Green's definition of ordinary good is much closer to the utilitarian definition of the good as pleasant than he is prepared to admit. There cannot be a very important difference between the pleasant and the desired, as well as between pleasure and self-satisfaction.
Locating the origin of the good in personal desire is one aspect of utilitarian revolutionary thinking. A traditional moral theory would define the good as what is reasonable. Defining the good as that which is desired (as opposed to that which is reasonable), in essence, gives each individual access to moral authority, and this is a very democratic thing to do. This is one reason why, I believe, all of these three thinkers placed a high value on the good of the individual. The good is not divorced from ordinary human nature, or from ordinary human pursuits which tend to be personal.
The moral good is different from the ordinary good. It is still related to human desire, however, not to just any desire, but specifically to the desire to do good for its own sake. Green describes a process of gradual transition from the pursuit of ordinary good, to the pursuit of moral good. His logic is as follows. The things we find desirable tend to change. Simple pleasure usually brings only a transient feeling of self-satisfaction, and often, its cessation is accompanied by pain. Therefore we start to seek satisfaction in objects that bring us a lasting feeling of welfare. We develop desires for things that are permanently good. What are these things? Green reviews two related categories of things: personal improvement and involvement in social activities. If we invest in developing a better character, we enjoy lasting benefits. If we do things that are good for others, as well as for ourselves, the goodness of our 23 T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1890, p. 178, section 171. action is magnified through the experience of others: the good does not finish when we cease to enjoy it-it continues in the enjoyment of other people.
The moral good, like the ordinary good, is linked to human desire. However, it is desired not so much for the personal benefits it brings to us, but because, through a process of development, we learn to desire the good for its own sake, or the good of others as much as our own good. There is a similarity between Green's moral good and Mill's higher pleasures. Mill tried to develop a more sophisticated concept of pleasure, and in a similar way to Green, he tried to unite personal perfection (high faculties) with care for others (nobility of character). This, however, could be tricky.
If the notion of the pleasant is stretched too far, it loses what is essential to it, that is, the absence of pain. As we saw, higher pleasures imply some experience of pain. The same applies to Green's notion of the desired-stretched too far it loses what is essential to it, i.e., the achievement of one's own well-being.
However, because the concept of the moral good is central to Green's moral philosophy, it is more thoroughly developed and more useful than Mill's concept of higher pleasures: more useful for the purposes of moral theory. First, it is more enlightening with respect to our understanding of the nature of the moral good. It has a more direct social bearing. Whereas in Mill the element of personal perfection is stronger than the element of social awareness, this is reversed in Green. In a trade-off between becoming an excellent musician and doing something that would be more beneficial to society-accepting that these two could not be done together-Green would always recommend doing the good thing for society. Green's concept of personal perfection is more deeply embedded in social well-being than Mill's.
Secondly, Green's concept of the moral good is more helpful than Mill's concept of higher pleasures because of Green's greater awareness that there could be a conflict between the pursuit of the ordinary good and the pursuit of the moral good. The pursuit of the moral good implies suspension of purely personal interest. Personal interest is legitimate in the pursuit of ordinary good but is not legitimate in the pursuit of moral good. This is a significant sacrifice and involves exercising one's power of will. This could involve suffering and pain, but for Green, suffering and pain are not personal happiness and general happiness. Mill's higher pleasures and Green's moral good are reconciliatory concepts. They try to fulfill the ambitious project of making the pursuit of general happiness personally pleasant, of marrying the personal good to the common good. However, Green addresses the potential conflict between these two goods more successfully than does Mill. He is explicit about it: he reveals the costs of its solution, and he offers an answer to it. As stated earlier, the conflict between the personal good and the common good, when a conciliatory outcome is impossible, has two possible solutions-either in favour of the common good, or in favour of the personal good. Green provides a rationale for both cases. The solution he offers is the following. Personal good can be sacrificed in the name of the common good when this good is not crucial for personal flourishing and for the developing of one's moral personality. Personal good can be sacrificed when it has a limited, self-centred nature.
A justification for such a sacrifice is that these self-centred personal goods are not the only personal goods we have at our disposal. We are capable of pursuing personal goods that either have the potential to, or already do, embrace the common good. The sacrifice and its cost-a degree of suffering-should be acknowledged.
Personal good should be of primary concern to society, the government and to the legislators when this good is a necessary condition for the development of one's moral character. That means it is essential for one's flourishing as well as for one's development into a moral agent. This is Green's justification of rights. The cost is the same-some degree of discomfort for those who have to abstain from preventing the exercise of these rights. In both cases somebody's interest has to give way. And both cases boil down to the sacrifices made by individuals. Both cases are explained by the process in which moral good overrides ordinary good. What makes Green more coherent than Mill or Bentham in his treatment of the dichotomy between the good of the individual and the good of the community is his dual definition of the good. His own dichotomy between ordinary and moral good is helpful. In the cases of conflict between the personal and common good-which are essentially the morally difficult cases-resolution can be achieved through the process of moving from ordinary to moral good. Another of Green's advantages is his acceptance of some degree of suffering. The failure to acknowledge a legitimate use of suffering deprives Bentham and Mill of one of the philosophical tools to explain moral behaviour.
Conclusion
When a conflict between the common good and the personal good is at stake, traditionally, political theorists have given priority to the common good. The idea is that, if society as a whole does well, eventually people as individuals will also benefit, even if in the short term it will cost them some liberties and pleasures. 'what I happen to desire now', the basic link between the good and the pleasant/desired is purposefully maintained by all three thinkers even when they discuss more complex forms of the good.
Bentham lacks the theoretical consistency of Mill and Green, but it could be argued that he does not consider it to be of ultimate importance. His theory can offer us specific solutions that can be satisfactory for all practical intents and purposes. Mill explores-more than Bentham does-the potential of the utilitarian theory to defend the status of personal good. Green's philosophy turns out to be best suited for dealing with the irreconcilable conflict between the personal and the common good, because
Green's moral theory is sensitive to the process of development and change in the nature of the good. It can allow for, explain, and resolve, a conflict between different goods.
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